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Abstract
Russian Soft Power Cultivation in the United States of America: A Media Content Analysis of
Russia Beyond The Headlines

David Evans

The relationship between Russia and the United States of America has been a dominant feature
of the international relations landscape for much of the last century. Following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, this relationship has been significantly altered. Over the last decade, a
resurgent Russia has begun to exert its influence on the global stage once again. This effort has
been characterized by a mixture of traditional “hard power” and a relatively new form of “soft
power.” The government of the Russian Federation has developed a broad strategy for
engaging the rest of the world with the intention of improving the image of Russia. One
component of this effort began in 2007 when the Russian-government-owned Rossiyskaya
Gazeta newspaper began to publish a supplemental news section in the Washington Post and
the Daily Telegraph. This supplemental news section is now known as Russia Beyond the
Headlines, and it is published in 26 countries and 16 languages. The purpose of this publication
is to engage an elite section of foreign audiences around the world, and hopefully influence
their mindset as it relates to Russia. This thesis provides a historical background of the Soviet
Union and Russian Federation’s efforts at cultivating soft power in general, as well as an indepth study of the content of Russia Beyond the Headlines during 2014 in the three domestic
US newspapers (the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal). This
study ultimately concludes that the content of Russia Beyond the Headlines within the US
market is adequately able to achieve its goals through a variety of strategies, and that further
research is needed to understand the larger impact of the Russian Federation’s exercise of soft
power in both the United States of America and around the world.
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1. Introduction
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many experts
around the world decided that the Soviet Union’s successor state, the Russian Federation, no
longer had any viable means of competing with the Western world. In the beginning this was
certainly true. Russia’s economy was in terrible shape, and the transition from a centrally
planned economy to a free market economy was proving to be difficult for most if not all
countries participating in this process, and this was certainly the case for the world’s largest
country by size. However, the beginning of the 21st century has seen the reemergence of
Russian power due largely to the rising price of oil and natural gas, which Russia has in
abundance, along with the stabilization of the political situation under the rule of Vladimir V.
Putin.
As a result of this economic and political resurgence, Russia has begun again to demand
that its interests on the world stage should be respected. In the last year and half, we have
seen this geopolitical competition turn hot in Ukraine. Both sides have openly been speaking of
the start of a new Cold War. Opinion polls in Russia and the United States have shown that
both countries’ general publics have followed their leaders on the march toward a renewed
conflict, whether it be cold or hot remains to be seen.
However, these old tendencies come in a different era. The world is no longer
ideologically divided between totalitarian communism and free-market democracy. The world
has globalized. We are more inter-connected today than we ever have been. It is now possible,
thanks to the internet and inventions like Skype, to communicate to friends and family around
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the world for little to no cost. Social networking has provided voices for those that were
voiceless. In addition, the rise of new rivals such as the European Union, China, and the rest of
the BRICS countries has challenged the traditional notion of a US-Soviet bipolarity or US
unipolarity in international relations.
The larger changes in the world have also led to changes in the rivalry between the US
and Russia. Perhaps the most notable example of this is that the Russian Federation has
recently been investing in boosting its soft power/public diplomacy capabilities. This noticeably
different strategy in the struggle for influence in the world is one that is not new to the US nor
much of the Western world. In fact, the Soviet Union made a few attempts at its cultivation,
but ultimately these failed due to a variety of factors. Today, Russia has decided to give it
another go, and for the last decade, the Russian Federation has funded a variety of soft
power/public diplomacy initiatives. Many of these initiatives are rather new and have thus
gone virtually unstudied, at least in a systematic methodological manner.
One such soft power/public diplomacy initiative is called Russia Beyond the Headlines,
and this will be the focal point of the following thesis. This thesis will explore the nature and
theories behind soft power and public diplomacy, as well as provide a brief historical
background of both the general history of soft power/public diplomacy around the world, and
more specifically, its history in Russia and the former Soviet Union. The heart of this thesis will
be a systematic analysis of the structure, goals, strategies and overall effectiveness of Russia
Beyond the Headlines as a soft power/public diplomacy cultivation method during the
tumultuous year of 2014.
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2. Theoretical Background
2.1 What is Soft Power?

The concept of “hard power” vs. “soft power” has become increasingly prevalent within
international relations, both in the academic world and in the political realm. The initial term of
“soft power” as a contrast to a traditional “hard power” was first established by John Nye, Jr. In
a recent TED Talks speech, Nye describes the differences between traditional hard powers of
“carrots” and “sticks” and his idea of “soft power” by stating “[p]ower is simply the ability to
affect others to get the outcomes you want, and you can do it in three ways. You can do it with
threats of coercion, "sticks," you can do it with payments, "carrots," or you can do it by getting
others to want what you want. And that ability to get others to want what you want, to get the
outcomes you want without coercion or payment, is what I call soft power.”1 In this sense,
“soft power” is essentially a more nuanced strategy of achieving a person or a state’s goals,
without resulting to outright force by bullying or coercion through bribery. Furthermore, Nye
defines “soft power” as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals,
and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is

1

Films for the Humanities & Sciences (Firm), Films Media Group, and TED Conferences LLC, TEDTalks Joseph Nye Global Power Shifts, electronic resource (video) (Films Media Group, 2012).
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enhanced.”2 This “attractiveness” is key to understanding the stated goals of the Russian
Federation and the usefulness of Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH).
Nye also argues that “soft power”, when properly employed, enriches a state’s “hard
power.” Similarly, “soft power” typically manifests itself in direct relation or conflict to “hard
power.” However, Nye argues that “soft power” is a means of attraction, and that “[i]f you can
add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks.” 3 In
other words, by implementing a cohesive strategy of effective “soft power”, a state is able to
make its use of coercion (“carrots”) or possible force (“sticks”) all the more meaningful and
potent weapons in international diplomacy. If a country is able to bring its “hard” and “soft”
power into line with each other, then that country is able to produce a type of symbiosis that
Nye coins as “smart power.”4
The dream of “smart power” for a nation is not an easy one to achieve according to Nye.
In a recent article for Foreign Policy entitled “What Russia and China Don’t Get About Soft
Power,” Nye states that “[t]he soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at
home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
authority). But combining these resources is not always easy.”5 He goes on to argue that both
Russia and China share a fatal flaw in their intended “soft power” strategies, and that is
because “soft power” should be produced primarily by non-governmental actors, which he
2

Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x.
Joseph S Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, accessed February 16, 2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/.
4
Films for the Humanities & Sciences (Firm), Films Media Group, and TED Conferences LLC, TEDTalks Joseph Nye Global Power Shifts; Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power.”
5
Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power.”
3
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argues is largely the case in America. He states that “government propaganda is rarely credible.
The best propaganda is not propaganda.”6 Despite this critique, both countries continue to
employ government-driven “soft power” initiatives.

2.2 Who Produces “Soft Power”?

Although Nye’s creation of the word “soft power” is only a little more than a quarter of
a century old, the underpinning ideals have been in practice for a considerable amount of time.
Perhaps the best example of a state employing “soft power” strategies has been that of the
United States of America. The Declaration of Independence is an excellent example of just such
a use of “soft power.” By making what was essentially a simple tax dispute into a lyrically-based
diatribe professing the leading Enlightenment ideals of the time, American colonists were able
to curry favor among the great powers in Europe, and eventually were able to rouse French
support, which proved crucial in the eventual colonial victory. I am not arguing that one led
directly to the other, but there is no denying that Jefferson’s rhetoric played a role in currying
favor with France and Europe. The ideals expressed in the declaration have since become a
cornerstone of the American “identity”, and their use and the subsequent additions to them
have served over the years to be powerful propaganda and a fundamental aspect of America’s
“soft power.” In this sense, Nye’s assertion that “government propaganda is rarely credible”
should be taken with a grain of salt. Government propaganda can be credible if it has been
established long enough in a general narrative of a state’s perception by the rest of the world.

6

Ibid.
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Nye argues that “[m]uch of America’s soft power is produced by civil society —
everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture — not from the
government.”7 This assertion is one that should probably be challenged by more scholars, but
this is not the appropriate place to do so. However, it is important to point out that the United
States’ narrative is strongly reaffirmed by many universities (many of which are publicly funded
by the government) and a variety of foundations and think tanks (largely staffed by former
academics from the universities mentioned above or former government employees).
Furthermore, Hollywood and pop culture do a tremendous job of instilling fierce patriotism and
scenes of unbelievable grandeur relating to a mythologized America, and its history, politics,
and cultural superiority. This sort of all-encompassing patriotism and often blind retelling of
propaganda should be studied more carefully before statements such as Nye’s are taken at face
value. Again this is not the place to discuss this further, but the point is that who creates “soft
power” is very rarely an entity entirely separated from the government that it is supporting. If
“smart power” comes from the symbiotic relationship between “hard” and “soft” power, then
it must stand to reason that their relationship is closer than simply a government and an
“independent” civil society which explicitly supports the decisions and grandeur of that
government.
Again, this is not the place for a deeper discussion of American “soft power,” but I bring
it up simply to point out that the relationship between government and “soft power” is closer
than sometimes perceived, and that is certainly the case for Russia, although I would argue that
they are not alone in this strategy or system of producing “soft power” throughout the world.
7

Ibid.
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In other words, the production of “soft power” in conjunction with government is the norm,
instead of the exception. However, I argue that the perception of the separation can and
should be seen as a part of a “soft power” narrative. In fact, the lack of a perception of
separation between government and an “independent” civil society have been the impetus for
Russia’s program of “soft power” promotion. However, that will be dealt with a little later in
this chapter.
Indeed, other scholars have argued against Nye’s assertion that soft power is separate
from the government. Ying Fan argues that a better interpretation of “soft power” is that of
“cultural power” that comes directly from core values and domestic institutions, which are not
separate sources of “cultural power,” but in fact they are essential parts of a society’s culture.8
Fan goes on to argue that these core values and domestic institutions are fundamentally
shaped by the policies and actions of the government.9 In essence, Fan argues that many of
these “independent” sources of “soft power” create “potential soft power,” which the
government then selects those pieces of “potential soft power” that fit in with its policies, and
use them. As a result, the “potential soft power” produced by these “independent” agents are
in fact, cooperative with (if not reliant on) the support and continued use of their products,
which means that the processes of both should not be considered separate.

2.3 How is Soft Power Implemented? A Brief History of Public Diplomacy in the West

8

Ying Fan, “Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion?,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4, no. 2 (May
2008): 4, doi:10.1057/pb.2008.4.
9
Ibid., 4–5.
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Nye defines “soft power” as a tool that can be used in order to attract other countries to
want what you want. In order to implement this tool, governments often turn to what is called
“public diplomacy.” The US State Department’s website defines “[t]he mission of American
public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives,
advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign
publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and
Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.”10 It goes on to explain
that this is achieved by doing a variety of activities, which includes communications with
international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges,
international visitor programs, and U.S. Government efforts to confront ideological support for
terrorism.”11 In the same vain, public diplomacy is defined by Nye, in relationship to soft
power, as “an instrument that governments use to mobilize [soft power] resources to
communicate and attract the publics of other countries rather than merely their
governments.”12 In other words, public diplomacy is the mechanism by which governments
pursue their soft power goals.
Public diplomacy is not just a policy tool of the United States, and it is not new. For
centuries, prestige in Europe was determined largely by military and territorially strength. In
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the rising tide of nationalism throughout Europe began to

10

Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, “Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs,” January 20, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/.
11
Ibid.
12
Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 616 (March 1, 2008): 95.
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establish a clear set of parameters for who a people were and who they were not.13 As the
ideas manifested themselves at home and solidified into a cohesive narrative, nations then
began to want to promote that narrative beyond their borders. During the later portion of the
19th century, with the advent of faster communication, the ability for these nation-states to
exert their influence in other countries became easier. In 1883, after the French loss in the
Franco-Prussian War had left the country’s prestige damaged, the French government
established the Alliance Francaise, which was tasked with promoting French language and
literature abroad, and soon this led to the “projection of French culture abroad [which] became
a significant component of French diplomacy.”14 This tactic was soon established around the
rest of the continent and in the United States. In fact, during the early years of World War I,
the British and the Germans actively used their soft power resources to attempt to persuade
the Americans to join the war on their side.15
Soft power continued to be used and fostered for years after the First World War.
During the interwar period, the invention of the radio allowed for easier dispersal of what was
little more than governmental propaganda to be spread to all reaches of the Earth by most
European powers along with the United States.16 After the outbreak of the war, the US
expanded its operations even further and what became known as the “Voice of America
“modeled [itself] after the BBC, [and] by 1943 it had twenty-three transmitters delivering news

13

Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London;
New York: Verso, 1991).
14
Richard H Pells, Not like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World
War II (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 31.
15
Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 96.
16
Ibid., 96–97.
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in twenty-seven languages.”17 In addition to increasing its presence abroad, the United States
government also worked to foster support through the use of Hollywood films. The Office of
Wartime Information “worked to shape Hollywood into an effective propaganda tool,
suggesting additions and deletions to many films and denying licenses to others. And
Hollywood executives were happy to cooperate out of a mixture of patriotism and selfinterest.”18 To what extent this cooperation has ceased to exist is unknown, but the prevalence
of patriotic ideals and sometimes seemingly blatant propaganda in many American films
indicates that some relationship, whether tacit or direct, still exists today.
As the Cold War began after World War II, the United States increased its soft power
presence dramatically across Europe and the rest of the World. “Special radios were added
such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which used exiles to broadcast to the Eastern
bloc.”19 Hollywood movies and news media, along with cultural exchanges and other aspects of
public diplomacy, were used effectively and generously across Europe and around the world in
order to foster goodwill towards America. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and
communism in Europe, American efforts did not stop in any of these places, or the rest of the
world for that matter, but their budgets were cut significantly, and would not reemerge until
the September 11th terrorist attacks and the subsequent “war on terror.”20
With the advent of the so-called information age, sources of information have become
much more widely available, and thus, the government’s ability (or anyone’s for that matter) to

17

Ibid., 97.
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 97–98.
18
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control information output has become undermined. The wide variety of sources of
information has grown exponentially since the internet boom has taken place. Traditional
media (newspapers, newsreels, etc.) have suffered as a result of this explosion of information.
However, the credibility that the traditional media and some governments have established
remains a vital aspect of the effective use of soft power. As Nye explains, “credibility is the
crucial resource and an important source of soft power. Reputation becomes even more
important than in the past, and political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of
credibility. Governments compete for credibility not only with other governments but with a
broad range of alternatives including news media, corporations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, and networks of scientific
communities. Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility… governments compete
with each other and with other organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that
of their opponents.”21 This competition among governments and other activities is at the core
of the modern public diplomacy “battles” that rage around the world. The main purpose of this
thesis is to look at one of these “battles” in particular, and it takes place on a new battlefield
that has only recently been created.

2.4 The Issue of Credibility

As discussed above, credibility is at the heart of any effective use or development of soft
power. The variety of different avenues with which Russia has engaged with the rest of the

21

Ibid., 100.
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world and the United States of America in particular have all faced a variety of credibility and
propaganda accusations (discussed further in the Empirical Background chapter). The issue of
credibility that is important to this thesis is the credibility of the RBTH inserts that are featured
in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times. Why does RBTH
maintain a sense of credibility? What makes a publication or article credible?
In general, the accumulation of credibility, and the maintenance of that credibility, can
occur in primarily three ways. First, is the established credibility that a state has built up over
time, and which is specific to each state, each culture, and truly to each individual in much the
same way that identity and narratives are understood to occur. Ben D. Moor describes this by
saying that “[i]ndeed, the ubiquity of credibility talk, even across cultures, indicates that the
process itself of crediting proﬀered arguments has deep psychological roots, related to the
stability of identities and the emergent social order.”22 The myriad of different influences that
affect our perception of the world will influence our own perceived idea of the credibility of the
source material. General trends within a culture or state can still be gleaned from various
methods, such as opinion polls, surveys, etc. despite the individual nature that is inherent
within the question of perception. In the same vain, the perception of a country and its
implementation of soft power cultivation techniques (i.e. RBTH, RT, RIANOVOSTI (now Sputnik),
Rossotrudnichestvo, etc.) comes from the media, NGO analysts, and government officials of the
country where these activities are undertaken. This is often understudied because of the sheer
volume of information, but in general, it can be assumed that with respect to Russia, the United
States media, NGO analysts, and government officials, along with a wide variety of other
22

Ben D. Mor, “Credibility Talk in Public Diplomacy,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 (April 2012): 394,
doi:http://dx.doi.org.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/10.1017/S0260210511000489.
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influence makers (i.e. comedians, TV shows, movies, etc.) portray Russia in a particularly
negative light, and are often suspicious of the intentions of Russia and Russians in general
(discussed further in the Empirical Background chapter).
The second means by which credibility is achieved, is by linking itself to an already
credible institution. By doing this, a piece of soft power cultivation can prove fruitful by the
mere association with the credible source. This is the case with RBTH, and part of the reason
for its success (discussed further in the Empirical Background chapter). In short, RBTH has
selected three of the most credible and respected newspapers in America to attach itself to.
The inserts are meant to look as similar to the actual newspapers as possible. They appear to
be just another section of the paper that just happens to be focused on Russia. Although there
is a brief description that states that RBTH is not affiliated with the newspaper in question, the
insert otherwise shows little signs of being separate from the rest of the paper. By attaching
itself to the newspaper, RBTH is able to gain legitimacy and credibility (not to mention
circulation) without any outside influence in the editorial process. This technique is fairly
effective, as long as it is done in conjunction with the third method.
The third method of obtaining and maintaining credibility is through the consistency
with which an entity conducts itself and presents its information. Moor explains that
“[c]onsistency is a strong determinant of credibility (hence the prominence of discrepancy
charges in discrediting strategies), and if a state’s advocacy is perceived as incompatible with its
foreign policy or military action, its reputation [soft power] and public diplomacy suﬀer.”23
Similarly, this goes to the heart of Nye’s argument for why governments tend to be ineffective
23

Ibid.
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as purveyors of soft power. Too often, their activities are seen as simple propaganda and they
can even do damage to a nation’s credibility. As Nye states, “[i]nformation that appears to be
propaganda may not only be scorned, but it may also turn out to be counterproductive if it
undermines a country's reputation for credibility.”24
The final method of obtaining and maintaining credibility is to create at least the illusion
that the instrument is not simply a tool of the government of the home country. Objectivity or
at least the perception of some level of objectivity is crucial to the success of the soft power
cultivation tool. Objectivity is defined by Merriam Webster as “expressing or dealing with facts
or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or
interpretations.”25 The perception of objectivity is clearly more difficult to obtain for a
government than it is for an individual or independent organization. Nye explains this
relationship by stating that “postmodern publics are generally skeptical of authority, and
governments are often mistrusted. Thus, it often behooves governments to keep in the
background and to work with private actors.”26
As I will discuss in greater detail later in this chapter, Russia does not operate in a
manner similar to that of the West in terms of government’s role in soft power cultivation and
public diplomacy. As a result, Russian soft power cultivation attempts inherently face
skepticism. In order to combat this natural stigma, the Russian government must attempt to
establish its objectivity, and subsequently its credibility, in a different way. The most straight

24

Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 100.
Merriam Webster, “Definition of Objective,” accessed February 19, 2015, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/objective.
26
Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 105.
25
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forward way to accomplish this is through self-criticism. As Nye states “it is sometimes
domestically difficult for the government to support presentation of views that are critical of its
own policies. Yet such criticism is often the most effective way of establishing credibility.”27 At
the very least, the acknowledgment of topics that might be banned or taboo in the home
county but generally accepted as reasonable topics in the receiving country should be discussed
in an open and frank manner that would be normal for the press of the receiving country to
publish. The nature of soft power cultivation must be toward a conversation with the target
audience on its level, which Nye explains by stating that “[b]y definition, soft power means
getting others to want the same outcomes you want, and that requires an understanding of
how they are hearing your messages and adapting them accordingly. It is crucial to understand
the target audience.”28
Soft power is fundamentally about seduction. A state is hoping that through soft power
cultivation tools a person or group of people will find its image attractive, and thus they will be
more willing to support the actions of the government, the businesses, and the wider aims of
this foreign state. “Policies that appear as narrowly self-serving or arrogantly presented are
likely to prohibit rather than produce soft power.”29 Instead, the soft power cultivation tools
must present a credible story that appears to be objective on at least some reasonable level,
and that speaks directly to the target audience in a clear, concise, logical manner that is
consistent with the normal dialogue of the medium being used in order to be effective. This
thesis will analyze RBTH, and determine whether it is able to accomplish these criteria.

27

Ibid., 106.
Ibid., 103.
29
Ibid., 102.
28
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2.5 Russian Soft Power/Public Diplomacy vs. Western Soft Power/Public Diplomacy

The perception in Russia of soft power and public diplomacy is slightly different from
that of its Western counterparts, for a variety of reasons. Alexey Dolinsky identifies a few of
these reasons in a recent paper about a roundtable discussion on public diplomacy sponsored
in June 2012 by the Russian Council for International Affairs. The first issue that he identifies
deals with the translation and definition in Russian. The term as literally translated mean
“общественная дипломатия” in Russian, and for some time this translation was used.
However, this term has a connotation and understanding in Russian that created “a dangerous
confusion: even certain experts are convinced that public diplomacy is no more than a dialog at
the level of non-government organizations.”30 As discussed above, this leaves out a large chunk
of the Western definition of public diplomacy. As a result, the more appropriate translation
should be “публичная дипломатия”, which carries roughly the same meaning and
connotations as the English term “public diplomacy.”31 Furthermore, the issue of the
translation and the definition of the English term “soft power” in Russian can also be an issue.
As Dolinsky describes it, “[t]he term “soft power” was translated into Russian in different ways
at different times – as «мягкая мощь» [мягкая means “soft” or “mild” and мощь means
“power” or “might”], «гибкая сила» [гибкая can mean “soft” but also “flexible” or “supple”,
and сила means “force” “strength” or “power”] etc. Today the most widely used translation is
«мягкая сила»; however, the term «власть» [власть means “power”, “authority” or “rule”] –
30
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as an ability to make others do what one wants – seems to be closer to the original meaning
than «сила».”32 However, much of the early confusion over the dynamics of the literal name
have been discarded as a result of President Putin’s various speeches on the subject of soft
power and public diplomacy.
In a speech to Foreign Service officers on July 9, 2012, Putin described his own and thus
Russia’s understanding of soft power. He stated “that ‘soft power’ is all about promoting one’s
interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one’s country,
based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage.
Russia’s image abroad is formed not by us and as a result it is often distorted and does not
reflect the real situation in our country or Russia’s contribution to global civilization, science
and culture. Our country’s policies often suffer from a one-sided portrayal these days… But our
fault lies in our failure to adequately explain our position. This is where we have gone wrong.”33
He goes on to point out that Russia must promote the use of the Russian language and cultivate
assets among Russian “compatriots” and ex-patriots living abroad, who he claims are more
willing to help their mother country then previously understood.34 It is here, and in a variety of
similar speeches and articles like it, that Putin shows his most dramatic and meaningful
divergence from the Western view of what soft power is and how it should be used. Putin’s
view of soft power is less about attraction and more about coercion and confrontation. He
certainly understands that the promotion of Russian culture, language, etc. can help to provide
Russia with tangible advancements in politics and economics abroad. However, he fails to take
32
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into account the larger nature that Nye has identified as being the three resources that a
country relies on to establish and increase its soft power.
Once again, the three resources that Nye argues are foundationally vital to a state’s soft
power are: “[1] its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), [2] its political values
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and [3] its foreign policies (when they are seen
as legitimate and having moral authority).”35 Putin clearly understands the first of these
criteria. He also understands that Russia must defend the legitimacy of its foreign policies and
actively engage in promoting the morality and reasoning behind them. However, Putin makes
no mention of the importance of emphasizing Russia’s political values except through the
justification that the other side is doing the same thing (i.e. two wrongs make a right). In
fairness, this type of rationale can stand up to reason, but it rarely helps to garner goodwill for
either side. The reasoning behind this omission may be due to Russian politics and Western
politics having substantially different ideas of how the other works and who is correct.
Nevertheless, Putin still sees many of the goals of soft power in at least a fairly similar light to
that of the West, and this thesis will analyze how one tool of Russian soft power adheres to the
presumptions of soft power in both the theorized Western and the theorized Russian concepts.
Finally, the Russian notion of soft power, unlike its Western counterparts, is essentially
propelled and generated primarily by the state itself. As stated above, Nye argues that soft
power should be primarily cultivated by non-governmental organizations (i.e. the domestic film
industry; the domestic, independent news media; independent NGOs; etc.). 36 However, the
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nature of Russia is such that the existence of these entities do not exist, are underfunded or
deemed “unreliable” for proper soft power cultivation. In fact, many of these groups that are
separate of the government umbrella in Russia are active in undermining the credibility of the
Russian government, and thus its ability to cultivate and grow the soft power of the state. As a
result, the government has undertaken the majority of the burden for this creation of soft
power around the world. However, Putin’s regime is mindful of that which it does not
necessarily possess. In its attempt to cultivate soft power, the Russian government has funded
a variety of media initiatives (including RBTH), along with creating and/or funding a variety of
NGOs. These institutions claim to operate in a manner that is similar to their Western
“independent” counterparts. Whether they accomplish this claim or not is at the heart of this
thesis.
The nature of Russian soft power and public diplomacy can be seen as a hybridization of
their traditional Western understandings. The end result is a system of government-funded
media outlets, NGOs, exchange programs, cultural programs, language schools, etc. that are
meant to function in much the same way as their Western “independent” counterparts. The
idea of objectivity in any entity that is attempting to utilize public diplomacy is questionable at
best. The term “public diplomacy” was itself coined by Dean Edmund A. Gullion of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy in the mid-1960s in order to describe this new concept.
Subsequently, he went on to describe how the naming of this practice came into being and its
relationship with propaganda: "Even beyond the organ of the Government set up to handle
information about the United States and to explain our policies, what is important today is the
interaction of groups, peoples, and cultures beyond national borders, influencing the way
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groups and peoples in other countries think about foreign affairs, react to our policies, and
affect the policies of their respective governments. To connote this activity, we at the Fletcher
School tried to find a name. I would have liked to call it 'propaganda.' It seemed like the nearest
thing in the pure interpretation of the word to what we were doing. But 'propaganda' has
always a pejorative connotation in this country. To describe the whole range of
communications, information, and propaganda, we hit upon 'public diplomacy'." 37 Merriam
Webster defines “propaganda” as “ideas or statements that are often false or exaggerated and
that are spread in order to help a cause, a political leader, a government, etc.”38 To disparage
Russia’s hybrid version of public diplomacy as mere propaganda is essentially the pot calling the
kettle black.
What then becomes important is the idea of credibility as discussed above. Without
credibility, no meaningful soft power can be created nor can it be possibly implemented. As
such, this thesis will look to examine how RBTH manages (or attempts to manage) its credibility
throughout the course of a year where the “product” (Russia) that it is attempting to sell
becomes fairly toxic in the minds of many of its intended readers and certainly within the larger
context of public opinion in the United States. Objectivity (or the perception of some level of
objectivity) remains an important factor in the maintenance of credibility, especially during
times of difficulty (as discussed above). The audience of RBTH in America is an intelligent,
educated audience (discussed further in the Empirical Background chapter). By the very nature
of the insert being inside an American newspaper, we know that the readers consume some
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amount of that larger newspaper and the version of the news contained within it. As a result,
any instance where the guise of objectivity is dropped will prove to be detrimental to the
overall effectiveness of the insert as a cultivation tool for soft power. The balance between the
appearance of objectivity and the inherent subjective nature of public diplomacy is at the heart
of creating credibility, along with maintaining interest in what is being transmitted through
whatever the medium might be. Without public interest, the raison d'être for RBTH vanishes.
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3. Empirical Background
3.1 The History of the Developme nt of Russian/Soviet Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
The Soviet Union’s Soft Power/Public Diplomacy

The Interwar Years

During the early years of the Soviet Union (1920s-1930s), cultural ties to the West were
still fairly strong, and the Communist Part/state apparatus attempted to maintain and grow
these relationships. These ties existed in part because of the large number of Russian
revolutionaries (now Communist Party members) who had spent time in exile in Western and
Central Europe, and who subsequently spoke the languages and understood the cultures, and
perhaps most importantly, they still maintained contacts there.39 One of the primary benefits
of these relationships for the Communist Party/state was the notoriety of some of these men,
which provided the state with excellent references and fostered an air of legitimacy for many of
the Communist Party/state’s early actions when these men would simply lend their support to
these actions.40 For this reason, the relationships were initially deemed very important to the
Communist Party/state, but eventually the distinction between internal and external threats
resulted in distrust and animosity toward these relationships, especially in the 1930s, when
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paranoia and purges eliminated many of these previously established relationships and the
credibility that they embodied.41
In order to foster, maintain, and grow these and other cultural ties and relationships,
the Soviet Union in 1925 created the “All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries” (Всесоюзное общество культурной связи с заграницей), which is better known as
VOKS.42 This organization was responsible for a wide variety of cultural affairs both foreign and
domestic. According to Michael David-Fox, “VOKS coordinated a vast and variegated set of
responsibilities that combined “internal” and “external” concerns and activities. Abroad, it
managed the “societies of friends” of the Soviet Union, as the burgeoning number of cultural
friendship societies were informally called; gathered information on public opinion and
intellectual trends; published widely circulated bulletins on Soviet cultural life; and supplied the
press with information, articles, and photographs. At home, it received foreign intellectual
visitors and arranged their contacts and tours within the Soviet Union; managed cultural,
scientiﬁc, and book exchanges; and engaged the domestic intelligentsia for its various activities
and publications.”43 The many duties encompassed in one large organization were actually the
result of a merger between a variety of different committees and other organizations that were
aimed at providing guides and other help to aid workers in the early years of the 1920s with
most notable of these committees being the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) Commission
on Foreign Aid.44
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TsIK was led by Olga Davidovna Kameneva, who was the sister of Lev Trotsky and the
first wife of Lenin’s deputy Lev Kamenev, and she eventually became the first director of
VOKS.45 TsIK was tasked with coordinating the activities of foreign aid workers that Lenin’s
government reluctantly accepted during the Russian Civil War.46 In order to effectively do this,
Kameneva and TsIK assigned guides to help the aid worker. During the Civil War, many of these
guides were by necessity not communist and held independent opinions due to the fact that
they needed to be highly educated and highly skilled in foreign languages, and many of them
also happened to be Jewish.47 After the end of the Civil War and the creation of VOKS, these
guides began to face increased scrutiny for their ideals and conduct, which eventually led to
Kameneva instituting a new training program for guides that would focus on “political literacy”
in 1927.48
Over the subsequent years, these guide training programs began to train the tour guides
not only how to be politically sensitive toward the Soviet Union’s goals, but they also faced
pressure towards “proletarianization and “Bolshevization” as did Soviet education as a whole.
They were renamed “Communist Courses for Guides” and all of the ﬁfty students were
Communist Youth League or party members.”49 All of these changes came as a byproduct of
“Stalin’s Great Break,” and these issues mirrored much of the political turmoil and paranoia
that was characteristic of the late 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union.50 The leadership of
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VOKS reflected these changes and the nature of the times. Despite her husband and brother’s
falls from power in 1927, Kameneva was able to last three more years before she was removed
from office in 1930.51 She was replaced by an Old Bolshevik named Fedor Nikolaevich Petrov,
who had formerly worked in the Main Directorate for Scientific, Artistic, Museum, Theatrical,
and Literary Institutions and Organizations, which was a part of the People's Commissariat for
Education, and signaled the leadership’s intention for the organization to follow the party
line.52 Petrov lasted until 1934 when he was replaced by Alexander Arosev, who was a former
Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and a long-time friend of Vyacheslav Molotov.53 Arosev was
arrested in 1937 during the early stages of the Great Terror, and then he was replaced by the
filmmaker Viktor Fedorovich Smirnov, who would remain in charge until 1940.54 The chaotic
nature of the leadership was clearly reflected in the manner with which the Soviet guides they
oversaw reacted. During the course of the 1930s guides increasingly became combative and
defensive with foreign visitors, and censored themselves and the reports that they were
required to submit to the secret police on the nature of the questions these visitors asked along
with their own responses in order to save themselves from scrutiny.55
Despite these pressures and the all-consuming paranoia of the times, many of these
foreign travelers presented a “rosy picture” of the Soviet Union, which helped to foster
goodwill with organizations in their home countries.56 Many of these travelers belong to socalled “fellow travelers clubs” or to other organizations sympathetic to the Soviet Union. One
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such organization was the British Society for Cultural Relations between the Peoples of the
British Commonwealth and the USSR (SCR). The organization organized tours to the Soviet
Union and wrote sympathetic articles and pamphlets about the Soviet Union and the
communist cause. It also organized other cultural and political events and initiatives in
London.57 These organizations worked in close coordination with VOKS, but the actual nature
of this relationship was more a cooperation, and less a direct channel for propaganda,
according to Emily Lygo.58 Lygo states that “although the SCR was a pro-Soviet organization, its
enthusiastic presentation of Soviet culture was not so much the result of Soviet manipulation
behind the scenes as a reﬂection of the enthusiasm for the USSR that active members nurtured
for a wide variety of reasons.”59 Even during the late 1930s and the show trials and rumors of
the great terror, membership in the club did not suffer.60 The SCR would remain a source for
positive news about the Soviet Union and its developments throughout World War II. 61 In
contrast, Michael David-Fox argues that the Soviet mindset began to become distorted due to
these interactions and that eventually the Soviet leadership would see in these writings the
notion that the Soviet Union was superior to the West, just as many of the fellow travelers in
the late 1930s would begin to see the Soviet Union as inferior to the West. 62 As a result, DavidFox argues that the Soviet Union and VOKS adopted a xenophobic stance that was born out of
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this sense of superiority, along with the distrust of foreigners that sprang from the paranoia
that was central to this period of Soviet history.63
The nature of the Soviet Union’s attempts at fostering goodwill and soft power during
the interwar period were initially somewhat successful, but ultimately their attempts would fail
due to a few main reasons. In order to evaluate this, Nye’s statement (“[t]he soft power of a
country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others),
its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when
they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority”) must be reapplied.64 In the case of the
interwar Soviet Union, its culture was attractive to others, but its actions at home and abroad,
the projection of its political values and foreign policy, did little to foster goodwill or boost
Soviet soft power. The SCR may have stood by the Soviet Union despite the MolotovRibbentrop pact and the Great Terror, but much of the rest of the left wing in Britain
abandoned its support of the Soviet Union because of these and other similar actions.65 In
addition, many of the fellow travelers eventually turned on the Soviet Union, due to the many
inconsistencies and failings that they witnessed on the ground in the Soviet Union. In the end,
the Interwar Soviet Union’s attempts at soft power failed because of the failure of the Soviet
Union’s leadership to live up to the ideals that it preached, but it was also clearly helped along
by the chaotic nature of both the political order in Europe at the time and the monumental task
of rapid industrialization that was underway in the Soviet Union during this period.

63

Ibid., 334–335.
Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power.”
65
Lygo, “Promoting Soviet Culture in Britain,” 592–593.
64

P a g e | 30
The Post-War Years and the Cold War

VOKS remained in existence until 1958 when it was replaced by the "Union of Soviet
Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries" (SSOD) (Союз советских
обществ дружбы и культурной связи с зарубежными странами).66 During the early years of
the Cold War before this transition, there were still some small level of cooperation and cultural
exchange for VOKS, including the Bolshoi Theater’s ballet company visiting Britain, however,
the contentious nature of the early Cold War, including the Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech,
the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, and the House Un-American Activities Committee,
resulted in the Soviet withdrawal from most attempts at cultural exchange with the West and
vice versa.67 As a result, the Soviet Union focused much of its attention for spreading soft
power by looking at its own empire and constituent states along with third world countries. In
essence this is what led to the change in name and strategy of the SSOD. According to the
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, the SSOD was a:
union consist[ing] of 63 friendship societies, assigned to deal with various countries,
including 12 socialist countries. It includes the USSR-France, USSR-Great Britain, USSRFinland, and USSR-Italy societies, the Society of Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations, and the
USSR-Arab Republic of Egypt Friendship Society. Other societies include associations for
friendship and cultural relations with Arab, African, and Latin-American countries, 11
associations and sections for scientists and cultural workers, 14 republic societies, and
six branches in cities of the RSFSR (Leningrad, Volgograd, Irkutsk, Sochi, Tol’iatti, and
Khabarovsk). The Association for Exchange Between Soviet and Foreign Cities is also a
member of the union. The union’s friendship societies include 25,000 enterprises,
kolkhozes, sovkhozes, educational institutions, and scientific and cultural agencies.
More than 50 million people participate in the union.68
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In addition, the union maintained two newspapers (a daily and monthly version) that aimed at
bringing news of achievements of the Soviet Union to people around the world.69
Unfortunately, there has been very little scholarship investigating the activities of these
organizations and their effectiveness. However, an issue that must be highlighted is the
“voluntary” nature of these “friendship societies.” 70 At the heart of this issue from a soft power
perspective is that these were largely not voluntary friendship societies, and although they
were possibly intended to mirror Western public diplomacy efforts, they were essentially
instruments of propaganda. As such, they received little to no soft power benefits from these
organizations.
The Soviet Union attempted other activities that were aimed at fostering goodwill
toward the Soviet Union around the world (especially the Third World) like financing
construction and giving aid. The construction of the Anwar Dam could be seen as such an
effort, along with the creation of a “Friendship University” in Congo. However, most of these
efforts resulted in little noticeable or at least documented changes. Ultimately, the totalitarian
nature of the Soviet Union and the corresponding nature of the governments that it fostered,
left little room for true soft power development. As Nye puts it, “The Soviet Union once had a
good deal of soft power, but it lost much of it after the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Soviet soft power declined even as its hard economic and military resources continued to grow.
Because of its brutal policies, the Soviet Union’s hard power actually undercut its soft power.”71
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3.2 Post-Soviet Soft Power and Public Diplomacy

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideologically driven entities of the Soviet
Union’s failed public diplomacy/soft power effort were disbanded. In their place, the Russian
Federation has created a variety of different entities that act in a relatively independent fashion
from one another. Each entity has its own goals and financial structure. The main
organizations that are focused on public diplomacy and/or soft power are Rossotrudnichestvo,
the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Valdai International Discussion Club, the Alexander Gorchakov
Public Diplomacy Fund, the Russian International Affairs Council, the Rossiya Segodnaya news
agency, the RT news channel, and Russia Beyond the Headlines.

Rossotrudnichestvo

Rossotrudnichestvo is officially called “the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation”
(Федеральное агентство по делам Содружества Независимых Государств,
соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом, и по международному гуманитарному
сотрудничеству). It is a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to article 100 of the
2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Rossotrudnichestvo “participates
in elaborating proposals and implementing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the
field of assisting international development, providing international humanitarian cooperation,
supporting Russian compatriots living abroad, strengthening the position of the Russian
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language in the world, and developing a network of Russian scientific and cultural centers
abroad.”72
Rossotrudnichestvo is the official government agency tasked with leading Russia’s
“public diplomacy.”73 According to its website, “[public diplomacy] involves all kinds of
interactions with civil society and foreign countries’ public, giving the unique capacity for
enhancing the state’s international relations.”74 The website continues by laying out the
manner with which the organization carries out its public diplomacy mission by stating that:
public diplomacy includes such elements as non-governmental organizations and
communities, ‘twin cities’ contacts, social and political activities, international
nongovernmental organizations… Not only the public diplomacy in the international
humanitarian cooperation should facilitate the further creation of positive image of
Russia, but it should also promote the implementation of the specific country’s
interests. Rossotrudnichestvo fruitfully cooperates with such non-governmental
organizations as ‘Russian World’ Fund, Russian Public Chamber, St. Andrew the FirstCalled Foundation, ‘Russian Overseas’ Library Foundation, Russian Culture Fund,
International Russian Compatriots Fund, Theatre Union of the Russian Federation,
International Council of Museums, ‘Twin Cities’ International Association, Moscow
Friendship Communities Fund, St. Petersburg International Cooperation Association,
etc.75
Rossotrudnichestvo was created by presidential decree in 2008. Its main function is
promoting Russia in the former Soviet Republics, and it has cultural centers in all of the former
Soviet Republics except for the three Baltic States, which have refused to sign agreements with
the Russian government that would allow for their establishment.76 Rossotrudnichestvo has
also expanded around the world with cultural centers in Washington DC, Beijing, London, and
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fifty-six other locations, along with “representative offices” in seventy-seven countries.77 These
centers and offices are tasked with promoting Russian language and culture, and some are
located in embassies and consulates, but most are in rented accommodations.78 For all intents
and purposes, Rossotrudnichestvo is the main driving force behind Russian public diplomacy
under the Western definition.

The Russkiy Mir Foundation

The Russkiy Mir Foundation was established by presidential decree in 2007 with the
express purpose of “promoting the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a
significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian language teaching
programs abroad.”79 The Foundation is a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Education and Science, and according to its website, it is funded by both state and
private funds.80 The Russkiy Mir Foundation is headed by Vyacheslav Nikonov, who is the Dean
of History and Political Science at the International University in Moscow. According to its
website, “[t]he Foundation’s Board of Trustees consists of prominent Russian academics,
cultural figures, and distinguished civil servants.”81 The website states that the Foundation is
meant “to promote understanding and peace in the world by supporting, enhancing and
encouraging the appreciation of Russian language, heritage and culture.”82 Similar to
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Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir Foundation has a specific goal designed for “Russian
compatriots” outside of Russia. “Russkiy Mir reconnects the Russian community abroad with
their homeland, forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programs, exchanges
and assistance in relocation.”83 The Russkiy Mir Foundation has 83 centers in 41 countries,
including 4 in Russia, 1 in Washington, D.C. and 1 in New York City.84

Valdai International Discussion Club

The Valdai International Discussion Club was founded in 2004. According to the club’s
website, “[t]he club’s goal is to promote dialogue between Russian and international
intellectual elites, and to make an independent, unbiased scientific analysis of political,
economic and social events in Russia and the rest of the world.”85 The club claims that over 800
scholars and other representatives from almost 50 countries, including professors at Harvard,
Columbia, Georgetown and Stanford, have participated in club activities.86 The website is
vague about the nature of its funding, especially before 2011. In 2011 a non-profit organization
was established in order to expand “its activities to new areas, including research and outreach
work, regional and thematic programs.”87 In 2014, the website simply says that “the
Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club assumed all
responsibility for the club’s projects.
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The Foundation was established by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the
Russian International Affairs Council, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations
(University) and the National Research University – Higher School of Economics.”88 According
to its website, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy is an independent NGO established in
1992 that works closely with the Russian government and is made up of high-ranking public and
government officials, heads of business associations, prominent businessmen, the militaryindustrial complex, academics and media representatives.89 According to its website, the
Russian International Affairs Council is a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank that
was established in 2010 by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (discussed further later in this chapter).90 According to its website, the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations is a university with a focus on diplomatic training that gives
the impression of being an independent public university, except for the fact that its board of
trustees is chaired by Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and
much of the rest of the board are oligarchs and ministers of other government ministries. 91
Given this, the Institute is at the very least closely tied to the government. According to its
website, the National Research University – Higher School of Economics is a privately created
and privately funded university with links to universities across Europe.92 The school does have
a “supervisory council” that is filled with government officials and a few oligarchs, but
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according to the school’s website, the supervisory council plays no role in the governance of the
university.93
Despite the obvious attempts to distance the Valdai International Discussion Club from a
sense of government control, the club clearly has at least close ties with the government in a
variety of fields. In addition to the aforementioned links to the funding of the club, its annual
conferences have been attended by Putin, and he has given a speech at each one. Certainly,
the Valdai club should not be considered a simple mouthpiece for government propaganda.
The level of international cooperation is impressive, and the value of such an organization of
academic cooperation is certainly valuable. However, the club can be viewed essentially as an
extension of the wider effort of the Russian Federation to cultivate and expand its soft power
resources around the globe.

Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund

The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was established in 2010 by
presidential decree along with the Russian International Affairs Council, which the Fund works
with in close cooperation. The council is named after the famous 19th-century Russian diplomat
Alexander Gorchakov. According to its website, which is riddled with English language
problems, the Fund is tasked with “encouraging development of the public diplomacy field and
supporting establishment of a favorable for Russia public, political and business climate.” 94
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Essentially, the Fund is involved in supplying aid and assistance to all aspects of the Russian
public diplomacy effort. The Fund works with media, businesses, NGOs, and any other agency
that requires or wishes for its support in order to promote themselves to foreign audiences.
Typically, the Fund is involved in funding these efforts through grants. The Fund’s board of
trustees is again a veritable who’s who of Russian foreign policy, including Lavrov and other
government ministers and a variety of oligarchs.95 Furthermore, the partners of the Fund, as
listed by the website, are the Russian International Affairs Council, the Russkiy Mir Foundation,
Rossotrudnichestvo, and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO.)96

Russian International Affairs Council

The Russian International Affairs Council was established in 2010 by presidential decree
along with the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. As mentioned above, the Russian
International Affairs Council is a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank that was
established in 2010 by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. According to its website, “RIAC activities are aimed at strengthening peace, friendship
and solidarity between peoples, preventing international conflicts and promoting conflict
resolution and crisis settlement. RIAC operates as a link between the state, scholarly
community, and civil society in an effort to find foreign policy solutions to complex conflict
issues.”97 The Council’s activities are broken down into four categories: “research work and
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international expertise”, “education and enlightenment”, “communication and public
activities”, and “international activities.”98
Each activity has individual goals and tasks associated with it. “Research work and
international expertise” states that its “aim is to provide analyses and forecasts of global risks
and opportunities for the benefit of Russian diplomacy, businesses, educational centers, public
organizations, and their foreign peers.”99 To accomplish this work, the Council provides and
carries out studies and surveys associated with “burning issues in world politics,” funds
academic studies to carry out these studies and analyze them, provides pundits with data and
analysis, and provides translation services.100 All of this is claimed to be done in conjunction
with think tanks. The “education and enlightenment” branch of the Council states that its “aim
is to facilitate the training of career foreign policy workforce through integration into global
educational environment.”101 To accomplish this aim, the Council provides, organizes and
funds a variety of educational courses and internships. The “communication and public
activities” branch states that its “aim is to ensure interaction between representatives of
various professional groups in the context of new challenges and opportunities emerging from
modern global processes.”102 In order to accomplish this, the Council facilitates high-level
discussions among international political leaders and Russian government officials and
academics, along with organizing conferences and other events that facilitate such interactions.
The “international activities” branch states that its “aim is to create favorable conditions for
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Russia’s fastest integration into a global world by implementing multilateral network projects
and initiatives.”103 To accomplish this, the Council provides assistance in dealing with foreign
governments and businesses, analyzes foreign counterparts and potential partners, and
provides any other assistance that might be required to Russian businesses or NGOs. Overall,
the Council is a formidable and powerful advocate for all Russian interests in dealing with and
understanding the situations that exist outside of Russia in order to streamline the process of
integration and cooperation. The board of trustees of the council also includes the usual
members of government and the oligarchy. The partners of the Council include every entity
that is discussed in this chapter, as well as many others.

Rossiya Segodnaya

The Rossiya Segodnaya news agency was established in December 2013 by executive
order.104 The creation of Rossiya Segodnaya (“Russia Today” in Russian, but that should not be
confused with Russia Today, now RT, which is a separate entity) came as the result of a merger
and/or dissolution of the old RIA Novosti news agency and the Voice of Russia radio station,
both of which were state-owned.105 Curiously, Rossiya Segodnaya launched a replacement for
RIA Novosti called Sputnik a month before Rossiya Segodnaya was actually founded.106 In
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addition, Sputnik Radio was also similarly launched as a replacement for the Voice of Russia
radio station.107 The two entities work in harmony and produce content that is “entirely geared
toward foreign audiences” and is produced in many different languages including English and
Russian.108 The stated aim of Sputnik is to “point the way to a multipolar world that respects
every country’s national interests, culture, history and traditions.”109 In a different executive
order but on the same day, the controversial journalist Dmitry Kiselev was named director of
the new organization.110
As a new organization, information is relatively sparse with respect to nearly all aspects
of its activities, including the content that it produces. The reasons for its creation are unclear
as well. The executive order has little to say on the subject, and not enough time has passed
for a clear retrospective look at the reasons for its founding. The international media has
presented theories on the reason for its creation along with a healthy bit of criticism of the
organization, its founding, and the new director. The international press reports that the
decision was a political one that resulted from a conservative faction winning a battle against a
liberal element led by former RIA Novosti Chief Editor Svetlana Mironyuk, who wanted to
balance the organization’s coverage and gain some level of independence.111 The same media
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reports contemplate whether the move will lead to increased propaganda and censorship, and
criticizing the choice of Kiselev as the head of the new organization because of controversial
comments and stances that he has made over the course of his career. Although the complete
nature and role of the new agency largely remain to be seen, its predecessors provide a viable
look at the possible nature of the agency, which is clearly meant to produce positive news
stories about Russia.
RIA Novosti was created in 1941 two days after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, by
a decree of the USSR’s Council of People’s Commissars and the Communist Party Central
Committee.112 The decree established the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo) that was
responsible for covering news both at home and abroad.113 During the war, Sovinformburo was
responsible for all frontline reporting, and it contained a department for propaganda as well.114
After the war, the agency was tasked with being the primary voice for the Soviet government
abroad, and it was responsible for reporting on all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy
to an international audience.115 In 1961, the name of the agency was changed to the Novosti
Press Agency.116 In 1990, the name of the agency was again changed to the Information Agency
Novosti, and an additional aim was added to its agenda by the decree that stated the agency
was “[t]o provide informational support for the USSR's state domestic and foreign policies and
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proceeding from the interests of the democratization of the mass media."117 During most of
the Soviet period, the organization had bureaus in 120 countries around the world.118 After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, a new version of the agency was established by the Russian
government that was based on and incorporated the old structure of the Soviet agency.119
During the 1990s, the Agency was expanded to include radio and television stations, and in
2005, RIA Novosti, as it was then known, helped to launch the Russia Today television
network.120
The Voice of Russia radio station was created in 1929 under the name Radio Moscow.121
For years the station broadcast content in foreign languages, including English. During the
Soviet era, the station broadcast materials approved by the Soviet government. In 1993,
President Boris Yeltsin reorganized the station and changed its name to the Voice of Russia.122
Today, the radio station broadcasts to 160 countries in 38 languages, including 18 states in the
US.123

RT
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RT was created in 2005 as Russia Today. It is a round-the-clock news network that is
broadcast around the world in more than 100 countries.124 Originally, the network broadcasts
were solely in English and Russian, but now there are Spanish and Arabic broadcasts as well. 125
RT America is broadcast from Washington, DC, and it has specialized programs for its American
audience.126 In addition to traditional broadcast television, RT also has a large focus and
presence on the internet, where its YouTube channel was the first to receive a billion views.127
RT has come under considerable criticism from the press (discussed further below). However,
the channel has also been nominated three times for an International Emmy award in the News
category for its reporting on the Occupy Wall Street movement and hunger strikes of
Guantanamo detainees.128 RT states that its mission is to “cover the major issues of our time
for viewers wishing to question more and delivers stories often missed by the mainstream
media to create news with an edge. RT provides an alternative perspective on major global
events, and acquaints an international audience with the Russian viewpoint.”129

3.3 Russia Beyond the Headlines

RBTH began to publish inserts in 2007 in the Washington Post and the Daily Telegraph.
RBTH publishes print supplements (typically on a monthly basis) in 26 newspapers in 23
countries in 16 different languages, as well as maintaining 19 websites in 16 different languages

124

RT, “About Us — RT,” accessed February 21, 2015, http://rt.com/about-us/.
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
125

P a g e | 45

that are updated regularly.130 RBTH is a subsidiary of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, but the editorial staff
is separate from Rossiyskaya Gazeta.131 Rossiyskaya Gazeta is owned completely by the
Russian government, and it serves as the newspaper of record for the Russian Federation.132 In
America, RBTH now includes supplements in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.
Initially, the various supplements had different names, but as of April 2014, all English language
supplements have been called “Russia Beyond the Headlines.”133
RBTH’s stated mission is to be “a link between Russian society and a foreign audience,
offering its media platforms for a balanced and professional international dialogue.”134 In order
to accomplish this goal, “RBTH collects, selects and publishes in foreign languages topical
reports about Russian politics, public life, culture, business, science, history and other areas
that are usually not covered by foreign media for their domestic audiences.”135 Most of the
articles that RBTH publishes in its supplements are done by freelance writers specifically for
RBTH, but they also draw from other press sources in Russia.136 All articles are edited by RBTH
staff who are native speakers, and for the print supplements, the articles are further edited by a
copy editor hired by the partner newspapers in order “to make sure that RBTH material
complies with the editorial traditions, journalistic standards, rules and other specific features of
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the partner publications. As a rule, these copy editors are not members of the editorial staff of
the partner newspapers.”137
RBTH is funded primarily by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, but it also receives some funding from
sponsorships and commercial advertising.138 RBTH compensates partner newspapers for
publishing the supplements, as well as for other costs such as promotion of the supplements
and for studying readership and feedback.139
As a part of their agreement with RBTH, the partner newspapers are required to do
sociological and marketing research on the readership of the print supplements.140 These
studies are meant to assess readers' awareness of the project and feedback on it.141 According
to the RBTH website, these independent studies consist of 500-600 respondents who are asked
about how often they read or skim through RBTH, how much time they spend reading it, which
topics they are most interested in and which topics they would like to see covered in future
issues, how they view the current state of affairs between their country and Russia, etc.142
RBTH posts some of the results of these studies on its website. The results of the surveys for
the fourth quarter of 2013 for both the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal are
included on the website, but for some unknown reason, no results for the survey of its New
York Times readers has been posted.
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The two available surveys provide an insight into the readership of these supplements.
The results for the Washington Post are as follows:
RBTH Readership –
Almost half (46%) of The Washington Post readers have seen the RBTH print supplement in the last 6
months. 47% of RBTH supplement readers in The Washington Post spend more than 5 minutes engaging
with it.
The RBTH Audience (Print) –
The RBTH audience are regular readers of the quality press and are affluent and well educated. They
carry authority and impact in the community and demonstrate, through their consumption of RBTH, an
appetite for objective and varied information about modern Russia. In the particular case of The
Washington Post, 55% of RBTH supplement readers are Male, 83% are 35+ aged and 95% are educated to
degree level or above.
Positive Evaluation of RBTH in The Washington Post –
80% of those who read RBTH in print agreed that they would read it again. Two thirds of RBTH audience
agree that the articles are well written (66%) and contain new information (67%). Almost three quarters
(73%) of The Washington Post supplement readers agree that it is well written.143

The results for the Wall Street Journal are as follows (as noted above, before April, 2014
the RBTH supplement for the Wall Street Journal was called “Russia Business Insight”):
RBTH Readership –
More than half of WSJ readers (55%) have seen the RBTH print supplement in the last 6 months. Two
thirds (63%) of supplement audience have read at least two out of three issues of the supplement.
The RBTH Audience (Print) –
The Russia Business Insight audience are regular readers of the quality press and are affluent and well
educated. They carry authority and impact in the community and demonstrate, through their
consumption of RBTH, an appetite for objective and varied information about modern Russia. In the
particular case of WSJ, 75% of Russia Business Insight supplement readers are Male, 96% are 35+ aged
and 98% are educated to degree level or above.
Positive Evaluation of RBTH in WSJ –
Two thirds of Russia Business Insight audience agree that the articles are well written (66%) and
interesting (67%) Almost three quarters (72%) of WSJ supplement readers agree that it is easy for
understanding. More than half of the The Russia Business Insight audience agree that it analyses issues in
depth and logically. Almost half (46%) of the WSJ RBTH audience agree that it is up to date with current
trends, developments and thinking in their country and globally.144
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As the studies indicate, the readership of the RBTH supplements in both the Washington
Post and the Wall Street Journal are substantive. Both groups tend to be well educated. The
Wall Street Journal readers tend to be predominantly male, while the Washington Post tends to
have a more balanced gender ratio. In addition, both sets of readers tend to have a favorable
disposition towards the manner in which the supplements are written and the content that is
contained within them. Unfortunately, data about what the readers think about the current
state of affairs between Russia and the US is not available. Nor is there data from 2014, which
could show how the readership and perception of the newspapers changed over the course of
2014 at a time of increased tensions between Russia and the United States, which would
otherwise have been valuable for the sake of this thesis.
The number of readers is sizeable for both publications. For the Wall Street Journal, the
readership numbers indicate that the RBTH supplements in 2013 were viewed by almost
750,000 people during the past six months based on average daily circulation (approximately
1,360,000).145 Out of that group, almost 470,000 readers have read two out of three issues of
the supplement.146 The Washington Post has a much smaller circulation (377,466) than the
Wall Street Journal, but the Post’s RBTH supplement would still have had almost 175,000 readers

in the last six months.147 Despite having no data from the RBTH survey, the New York Times
had an average circulation of 639,890 during the period of April-September 2013.148
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Ultimately, the readership for all publications is fairly high, and as the RBTH website states, the
audience that it is targeted consists of “political, cultural, expert, business, and academic elites”
that are “well-educated, well-to-do and socially active people.”149 Thus, one of the central aims
of this thesis is to study and analyze what messages are being transmitted to this audience.
Credibility of RBTH

The two main attempts at reaching an American audience directly through the news
media (RT and RBTH) are relatively unique and similarly important to this thesis. The Russiangovernment-funded news outlet RT has received its fair share of accusations throughout its
entire time in existence, including claims of disinformation, biased reporting, propaganda, and
various other similar claims.150 Although these various claims and issues are not the focus of
this thesis, and as such they will not be discussed in depth, their existence and persistence is
fundamental to the issue of credibility, because the same thing cannot be said for the American
RBTH supplements, which are the focus of this thesis.
Since its initial inception in 2007, RBTH has received only mild criticism. The early
criticism, such as a 2007 article posted in Slate Magazine, which is owned by The Washington
149
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Post and is the publisher of the RBTH insert, focused on things like poor writing style or blanket
accusations against the inserts for being propaganda without any real examples being cited. 151
Later criticism, such as an article from 2012 for the political website American Thinker, criticized
an RBTH article’s coverage of the arrest and alleged torture of Leonid Razvozzhayev, and the
semantics used in its coverage, yet this can be seen as more of a disagreement on the style of
the reporting and less on its credibility.152 The other sparse but available criticisms come from
opinion pieces in newspapers or similar items, such as an article in the Daily Telegraph in 2014
about the Ukrainian crisis, which typically called for the end of the newspaper’s relationship
with RBTH due to a series of policy and other conflicts between Russia and the West.153 As a
whole, the criticism and complaints lodged against RBTH are far from similar to the accusations
lobbied against RT. Instead, the majority of accusations against RBTH can and should be seen
as either the stereotyping of lazy journalists/critics, or the run-of-the-mill criticisms that any
newspaper receives on a regular basis.
This thesis argues that the RBTH supplements in America have maintained a level of
credibility for three reasons. First, these supplements overcame the initial barriers that Russian
media typically face when attempting to reach an American audience (i.e. propaganda claims)
by attaching itself to and imitating the style of highly respected American newspapers. Unlike
RT which had to create an entirely new platform that wasn’t tied to any traditional, established
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group, the RBTH supplements were able to use this aura of respectability to have the targeted
audience take the time to read the inserts and evaluate them for their own merit.
Second, the quality and merit of the inserts were and are top notch. As discussed
above, by adopting the style of American newspapers, and specifically that of the newspaper to
which the supplement is attached, allows for the reader to have an intrinsic sense of trust
based on the familiarity of the writing. As discussed in the theoretical section, soft power
analysts agree that in order for a soft power cultivation tool to be useful, it must engage the
subject audience on its terms and in a manner to which it is familiar.154
Third, the RBTH supplements, while being targeted and typically, systematically positive
about Russia, are willing and able to criticize aspects of Russian culture, politics, society, and
economics. As Nye states, “It is sometimes domestically difficult for the government to support
presentation of views that are critical of its own policies. Yet such criticism is often the most
effective way of establishing credibility.”155 The American RBTH supplements certainly heed
this advice in a variety of ways (discussed further in the data and analysis chapter).
Ultimately, the RBTH supplements have been able to establish a sustained readership by
maintaining as close to journalistic integrity as a soft power/public diplomacy tool is able to do.
This is not to discount the fact that the content of these supplements has been carefully
selected and crafted in order to convey a message directly to their intended audiences. The
supplements sometimes share articles or aspects of articles with one another; however, each
supplement is intended for its own specific audience, and it is crafted in order to speak to that
154
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particular audience. This thesis analyzes how the various messages that these supplements are
conveying grow, change, and interact with each other over time. In addition, this thesis
analyzes how these messages interact with current events and the devolving relationship
between Russia and the US.

3.4 Anti-Russian Bias in American Media

One of the foremost reasons behind the creation of supplements like RBTH is the
Russian government’s belief of the American media’s bias toward Russia in its reporting. The
supplements are certainly soft power/public diplomacy tools that wish to help to create a
better image of Russia in American public opinion along with facilitating the advancement of
Russian business and other interests in the United States. As discussed above, soft power and
public diplomacy are designed and undertaken with the hope that a state will be able to attract
key actors other countries to want what it wants. This attractiveness is made all the more
difficult when consistent negative biases are believed to exist in the media of the targeted
countries. Certainly, no state has the responsibility to openly allow a foreign state to attempt
to persuade their citizens to act in the interest of that foreign state. However, overcoming this
perceived bias is central to the aims of the Russian government in producing the American
RBTH supplements. As stated above, the RBTH mission, according to its website, is to foster
“balanced and professional international dialogue” and to cover stories about Russia “that are
usually not covered by foreign media for their domestic audiences.”156 A primary research
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question for this thesis involves how the RBTH supplements attempt to challenge these
perceived media biases and stereotypes.
The issue of bias toward Russia within the American press has been studied and
allegedly confirmed in a variety of different academic articles and studies, which the Russian
government points to in order to show bias in the American media.157 In Katchanovski and
Morley’s study, “The Politics of U.S. Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries,” the
authors examined the television news broadcasts on ABC, CBS, and NBC about Russia from
1998 to 2009. They concluded that these “broadcasts… were dominated by negative stories,
such as tense relations with the United states, crime and criminals, spying and secret services,
and undemocratic developments in Russia.”158 They also found that “newly invented
stereotypes that associate Russia with children adopted in the United States, mail-order brides,
sex slaves, and oligarchs” were far more prevalent in the broadcasts than traditional images of
“vodka and alcoholism, cold climate and Siberia, bears, and Russian roulette.”159 This is
significant because it means that the stereotypes about Russia are evolving and becoming
related to hot button issues between the two countries.
In Andrei Tsygankov’s article “Blaming Moscow,” he studied the history and influence of
the “the Anti-Russian Lobby” in American politics and foreign-policy planning in relation to the
U.S. reaction to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. He later expanded this research into a larger
157
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book on the subject titled Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy.160 In
the article, he argues that “besides feeding to the general public the highly distorted image of
Russia as a power that is relentlessly autocratic, has no regard for civilian life, and is interested
only in restoring its domination in the Caucasus, the anti-Russian groups have contributed to a
hardening of official US policy on Russia.”161 Although Tsygankov did not conduct an empirical
study of the “lobby” or its activities per se, his conclusions support the findings of other studies
that did conduct such research. Similarly, Anatol Lieven’s article “Against Russophobia,” details
the actions and manifestations of Russophobic forces within America, and similarly he applies it
to a study of media representations.162
It is clear that the U.S. media portrays Russia in a negative light. For anyone that has
watched American late night talk shows, it is clear that Russia is portrayed negatively.
However, public opinion polls show that the prevailing perception of Russia among the general
population prior to the Ukrainian crisis was fairly mixed, although still largely negative. In a Pew
Research Center “Global Attitudes & Trends” poll, the responses from Americans about Russia
were generally favorable (those that answered "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable")
with the numbers rising from 42% in 2007 to 49% in 2012.163 While during the same period,
those in the US population with an unfavorable (those that answered "very unfavorable" and
"somewhat unfavorable") view of Russia rose between 35% in 2007 and 40% in 2012.164 These
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numbers indicate that more Americas were inclined to express a positive opinion of Russia
before the Ukrainian crisis, yet there was still a sizeable group with views that were unfavorable
towards Russia. In the 2014 poll, Americans with a generally favorable opinion of Russia fell
dramatically to 19%, while those with a generally unfavorable opinion of Russia shot up to
72%.165 This change is not especially surprising. However, the media in America has certainly
had an effect on this rise in anti-Russian feelings in America. It is in this context that RBTH and
its sister organizations have had to react over the course of 2014. This thesis evaluates this
response in a variety of ways through the lens of RBTH.
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4. Research Questions
As a result of my theoretical approach and empirical background research I posit eight
points for establishing the basis of my analysis: (1) that the soft power and public diplomacy
cultivation activities of the Russian Federation are a joint venture undertaken by the
government of the Russian Federation through both official government agencies and
government-owned media operations and think tanks; (2) this joint venture is accomplished in
a variety of ways including through the use of supplements in major foreign newspapers; (3)
that RBTH is a manifestation of this joint venture; (4) RBTH hopes to engage with the readers of
the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and the New York Times in a familiar manner; (5)
there is a consistent bias toward Russia in the American media, and RBTH is a part of the
Russian response to this by challenging the prevailing narrative; (6) 2014 was a particularly
difficult year for the advancement of Russian soft power in the United States of America due to
the crisis in Ukraine; (7) that effective soft power/public diplomacy cultivation involves more
than just politics or media-bias correction activities; and (8) the basis of a successful, mediabased soft power/public diplomacy cultivation strategy, such as RBTH, is credibility, which
results from a mix of factors including criticism of the sponsoring government engaging in the
activity.
Consequently, several research questions arise and the answers to them drawn from
the available evidence form the basis of my thesis. What is the nature of the content produced
for RBTH? How has this changed over time? How does RBTH deal with the Ukrainian crisis?
Does RBTH remain credible as described above?
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5. Methodology
The probing of my research questions will be carried out through a combination of a
quantitative content analysis and a qualitative analysis. The two aspects will work together in
order to be able to identify areas of interest for the producers of RBTH and the frequency and
prominence of their appearance over time, and to analyze trends in these data points.
Furthermore, the tone employed and strategies used by the authors will be identified, codified,
and ultimately analyzed in a similar manner to the areas of interest mentioned above.

5.1 Methods

At the heart of the analysis will be a quantitative content analysis. At the heart of a
quantitative content analysis is the ability to manage and analyze a large amount of
unstructured data over a period of time.166 In my research, I will use the quantitative content
analysis in two ways. The first aspect will be a straightforward coding system that will allow for
the general information of an article to be systematically catalogued. The information that will
be gathered from this process will be to find for each article these criteria: (1) the date; (2) the
genre; (3) the publication that it appears in [WSJ, WP, NYT]; (4) the author; (5) the length; (6)
the location within the supplement [what page]; (7) the prominence of the article on the
page(i.e. whether it is the main article on the page; a secondary article on the page, which
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usually means in the center of the page below the primary article; or an article on the periphery
of the page) ; (8) whether the article is accompanied by a photograph, cartoon, information
graphic (e.g. a poll, a graph or chart, or a brief mini-article relating to the main article), or some
combination of these items; and (9) whether the article featured in a “teaser” on the front
page.
The content of the article will then be assessed by a variety of means. In order to do
this, I will use a modified version of a qualitative analysis similar to the grounded theory
proposed by Anselm Strauss. By that, I mean that I will conduct a short analysis of each article
and identify the key areas of interest for my study and go through the process of developing a
coding structure along the way according to the open coding method proposed by Strauss.167 I
have adopted this open coding structure because of the unknown aspect of the specific content
that is contained within the RBTH supplements. Before my research began, the topics that
RBTH would discuss were largely unknown in the beginning of the research, thus the coding
needed to be able to grow and expand as a result of the changing nature of the RBTH
supplements.
The coding structure for this falls into the following general categories: (10)
geographical framing of the article (described further in the following chapter); (11) the specific
topic addressed in the article (described further in the following chapter); (12) the primary
framing of the article [what is the general focus of the article in relatively broad categories]
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(described further in the following chapter); (13) I determined the general approach of the
author to the primary framing of the article as determined in (12) as being positive, critical
{negative}, or neutral; the next step was then to analyze what the author was either positive or
negative about [for neutral no further determination was made], if the article was deemed
positive in (13) then, it would be coded in category (14); if the article was deemed critical
{negative} in (13) then, it would be coded in category (15); (16-18) follows the same criteria as
(13-15) except with relation to a secondary framing topic if there was a topic that warranted its
own individual assessment [i.e. having considerable influence on the meaning and purpose of
the article that is separate from the primary meaning] (19-21) follows the same pattern as the
(13-15) and (16-18) except with relation to a tertiary framing topic [again only if necessary and
substantially different from both the primary and secondary framing]. In the final step (22), I
determined the strategic framing of the article based off of my own assessment of the tone and
content of the article [more than one assessment in this category was possible]. These
strategies will be discussed in greater detail in the Results and Analysis chapter.
During the open coding process, I routinely corrected, added, merged ideas, renamed
codes, and modified the coding structure in accordance with Strauss’s theory of open coding.168
In addition, after all the coding was done, I performed one final consolidation effort in order to
clarify my findings and make them more digestible. After the process of coding was complete, I
was able to run a comprehensive content analysis of the data that I had coded.
I used the online content analysis software “Dedoose” to perform the coding as well as
the analysis, which was supplemented by the use of Microsoft Excel.
168
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5.2 Limitations of the Research Design

As with any methodology, there are of course limitations. Klaus Krippendorff identifies
two general limitations with the idea of content analysis. First, a problem arise with the fact
that a content analysis requires a large data set in order to be viable.169 In the case of my
research design, I have a substantial data set of nearly 450 pieces of data that allows me to
make certain judgments and conclusions on trends. Second, Krippendorff states that the
replicability of the content analysis can be a cause for concern.170 This is of course a concern
with any content analysis and mine is no exception. Although content analyses claim to be
objective, they are subjective in many ways. Regarding my particular research design, the
decision-making process involved in the open coding process is the result of my own
interpretations of the articles. However, this is unavoidable, as I am an intrinsically involved in
the entire process. There are some aspects like the date, location, author, etc., however, that
are indisputable and allow for the maintenance of a certain level of objectivity.
These criticisms of the process are not unique to content analysis, open coding or
qualitative analysis. All research involves at least some level of the researcher being involved in
making decisions that could possibly alter the eventual findings of the study. At least with
content analysis, there is a credible attempt at limiting the levels of subjectivity involved in the
research process. I would argue that the systematic nature of my methodology gives an added
sense of credibility to the process. While some subjectivity is inevitable, I argue that the
169
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combined nature of my approach allows for this subjectivity to be discounted in terms of the
qualitative aspects, due to the fact that they will also face the structure of a content analysis as
described above.

5.3 Source of the Data

As discussed thoroughly above, RBTH is a clear attempt at soft power/public diplomacy
cultivation on the part of the Russian Federation. Its nature has also been thoroughly
discussed. There are very few academic studies about RBTH, and none that examine its
publishing activity during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014.
This study is limited to the inserts that were published in the print editions of the
Washington Post (WP), the New York Times (NYT) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) during the
calendar year of 2014. The reasoning behind this decision has been discussed above in the
Empirical Background chapter. These supplements are supposed to be published on a regular,
monthly schedule, however, for reasons unknown, they have appeared irregularly. During
2014, 18 supplements were published in these three newspapers, 6 in NYT, 7 in WP and 5 in
WSJ. No supplements were published in January, July or August in any of the supplements.
Every other month had at least one supplement published in an American newspaper. See the
Appendix A for a full list.
Every article published in each supplement is included in this assessment, including
stand-alone information graphics or other pieces of a miscellaneous nature. The length of the
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RBTH supplement for NYT and WSJ are 8 pages long, while WP supplements are only 6 pages
long. As stated above in the Empirical Background chapter, the layout and style of each edition
is associated with the layout and style of the partner newspaper.
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6. Results and Analysis
6.1 Results

General Data

To begin, I will provide an overview of the general data on the articles analyzed. The
total number of pieces of data came to 449. The breakdown of these by category is as follows.
(2) Genre

NUMBER OF APPEARANCES BY TYPE
General Article

Interview

Opinion

News Brief
6%

Other

Standalone Info Graphics

Book Review

3%

4%

41%

32%

11%

3%

Each of these categories breaks down in this manner: a “general article” is any standard
journalistic article of substantive size; an “interview” is simply an interview that is reported in a
question and answer format; an “opinion” article is any article that is marked as an “opinion”,
“viewpoint” or other signifier, and/or that expresses the private views of an individual; a “news
brief” is any short article that provides only a headline or short text on a specific subject, and
typically labeled with the headline “news brief” or “news in brief” but also short blurbs about
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cultural events can also fit into this category; a “stand-alone information graphic” is an item
that is not directly attached to a larger article such as a poll, the “RBTH for Kids” section of the
NYT, a “headline quote” in WSJ, a travel advertisement in the form of an information graphic,
or a mini article; a “book review” is quite simply a book review; the “other” definition relates to
a variety of pieces that are either of insignificant number or of an insignificant content nature,
which included cooking articles, letters to the editor, letters from the editor, or short teasers
for online materials.
(3) Publication Accompanied

Publication Accompanied

200
150
100
50
Number Of Data
0
NYT

WP

WSJ

(4) Authorship
The overwhelming majority of articles were written by RBTH journalists or freelance journalists
hired by RBTH, as its website claimed. The importance and nature of the other authors will be
made more clear in a later section about the results of this research.
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Authorship by Data Piece Count
Other
Businessman
Government Official
Other Journalist or Editor
RBTH Editor
Academic/Thinktanker from US
Academic/Thinktanker from Russia
Other News Agency
RBTH Journalist
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

(5) Length of Article

LENGTH OF DATA
Long

Medium

Short article

Short Note

34%
46%
3%
17%

A long article consisted of over 500 words; a medium article had between 300 and 499 words; a
short article consisted of between 100 and 299 words, and a short note was 99 words or less
(typically a news brief or info graphic).
Framing of Articles

(10) Geographic Framing of Articles
The overwhelming majority of articles involve a geographical framing that is either in Russia or
involves an issue between Russia and the United States.
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GEOGRAPHIC FRAMING
Russia

Between Russia and US

Other

22%

49%

29%

For the other categories of geographic framing, there were exactly 100 pieces of data. The
break down for this group is as follows:

Geographic Framing (Other)
2%4%
15%

31%

17%
11%

3%
7%

6% 4%

US

Between Russia and China

Between Russia and NATO

Between Russia and EU

Between Russia and Ukraine

Ukraine

Russia/US/EU/Ukraine

Other

WTO

BRICS

As is clear from the data, RBTH is focused primarily on what is happening in Russia (49% of
total) and what is happening between Russia and the US (29% of total). The “other” category
has a large chunk devoted to the US, but this framing is a distance third compared to the two
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main categories (just 7%). At just 7% of total data pieces, the Ukrainian crisis is also given only
a cursory look, and even that is primarily dedicated to the geopolitical situation involving
multiple actors, which accounts for about 5% of the grand total leaving actual only 2% for
Ukraine itself.
As a result of these findings, I will provide a brief analysis of the two main framings (“In
Russia” and “between Russia and the United States”). The geographic framing of each article
also provides us with a variety of other data points to compare with the framing of content and
with that of the strategies and tactics.
The general layout for the “in Russia” data pieces was as follows:

Number of Data Pieces

"In Russia" by Publication
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Februar
y

March

April

May

June

Septem
Novemb Decemb
October
ber
er
er

Wall Street Journal

18

0

29

0

21

24

0

25

0

New York Times

0

5

0

7

0

13

10

7

10

Washington Post

5

5

6

0

6

6

5

9

0
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STYLE OF "IN RUSSIA" (PRIMARY FRAMING)
Positive

Critical

Neutral

20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
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MARCH

APRIL

MAY

JUNE

S E P T E M B E R O C T O B E R N O V E M B E RD E C E M B E R

For the “between Russia and the United States” data pieces the general layout was:

Between Russia and the United States
Number of Data Pieces

25
20
15
10
5
0
February

March

April

May

June

Septemb
Novemb Decemb
October
er
er
er

Wall Street Journal

4

0

5

0

6

0

0

4

0

New York Times

0

11

0

12

0

5
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10

10

Washington Post

9

9

7

0

6

6

10

7

0

P a g e | 69

STYLE OF "BETWEEN RUSSIA AND US"
(PRIMARY FRAMING)
Positive

Critical

Neutral

18
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12
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8
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4
2
0
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As we can see from both charts provided (as well as the data from the other geographical
framing codes), the level of consistency between them shows that NYT and WP are focused
more on the “between Russia and the US” mindset, while WSJ is focused more directly on what
is happening in Russia. It is important to remember that for certain months a supplement was
not published by its respective newspaper, so that can account for the falls to 0 in most cases in
these charts now and perhaps in the future as well, when seen over the course of time with a
large enough dataset.
(12) Primary content
The total number of data relating to the main primary coding categories are:
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Primary Framing by Category

14%

Politics

10%

Culture

8%

History

30%
36%

Economics
Ukrainian Crisis/Sanction

2%

Other

Economics and culture dominate the primary framing of articles. This makes sense for two
main reasons. First, Russia has a strong cultural past that is attractive to the American public.
Second, WSJ is a business newspaper, and the supplement for NYT is designated as a part of the
business section, although the NYT may not account for nearly as much of the economicsfocused items as the WSJ, as we see with the chart below:

Total Primary Framing Values By Category And Publication
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Politics

Culture

History
NYT

Economics
WSJ

WP

Ukraine

Other
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With this chart we see that news about economics is by far and away the most important thing
to WSJ. However, some of this can be accounted for due to the large number of “News Briefs”
that are short articles. There are many more of these “News Briefs” in the WSJ (between 1520) as opposed to NYT or WP which both have about 2-4 in each edition. As for the other two,
they have a relatively similar mix of categories. To look more closely at this, here is how each
newspaper’s primary content looks by category and date:

NYT Primary Content By Category and Date
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
March

May
Politics

Culture

September
History

October
Economics

November
Ukraine

December
Other

*NB the spike in “Other” articles in October is the result of a 2 page expose on the Russian
space program.
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WSJ Primary Content By Category and Date
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
February

April

Politics

June

Culture

History

September
Economics

November

Ukraine

Other

*NB The relative spike in “Other” in February and to a lesser extent April was Sochi coverage.

WP Primary Content by Category and Date
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
February

March
Politics

April
Culture

June
History

September

Economics

October

Ukraine

November

Other

These charts show us that the primary content of articles is fairly constant in each edition. The
supplements published in NYT are primarily targeted towards culture with politics and
economics added to the mix. The WSJ supplements are primarily focused on economics, with a
few political articles in each one, along with the occasional section on sports. The WP seems to
be comprised of a fair mix of different articles from nearly every category. Culture is still
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primarily dominant, but politics and “other” have a fair showing, with economics being more
prominent at different points. Notably, the WP discusses Ukraine as the primary framing
reference the most out of the three papers, with 8 articles about it, while NYT had 2 and WSJ
had 0.
Beyond the scope of the primary topic as a category, we have to look at how these topics were
discussed. In this section, I will present data on how each category was discussed by each
newspaper. However, for those areas that are underrepresented I will not provide a graph for
that category (i.e. history and Ukraine).

Politics
NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Politics
25
20
15
10
5
0
March

May

September
Critical

October
Neutral

November
Positive

December

Total
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WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Politics
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September
Neutral

November

Total

Positive

WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in Politics
25
20
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5
0
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June
Critical

September
Neutral

October

November

Total

Positive

The primary style framing is slightly different for each section. All three have similar sample
sizes. The NYT is fairly even across the spectrum and thus the editors of its RBHT supplement
seem to wish to present a balanced political outlook. The WSJ has mainly neutral or possibly
positive political views. Again this is consistent with a supplement that wants to engage its
readers in a motto of “business not politics” (more to come below on this subject). The WP
presents a different picture. Here the supplements take a position consistently and remain
neutral on only a few topics.
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Culture
NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Culture
100%
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Neutral

Positive

December

Total

WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Culture
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November
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WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in Culture
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Critical

Neutral

Positive

From these graphs, we see that for the most part each supplement is generally quite positive
about culture. Both the NYT (63) and the WP (48) have relatively large sample sizes compared
to WSJ (8). However, for all of them, the evidence is clear. Positivity about culture is good for
soft power cultivation, which is fairly obvious. There is little backlash to praising either one’s
own or the other’s culture (more below on this in the strategy section).

Economics
NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Economics
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WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in
Economics
100%
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Total
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WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in
Economics
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For economics, the data set situation is now reversed. WSJ had 110 items from the
supplements devoted to economic news, while NYT had 20 and WP had 14. NYT had a mix of
style framings from each category again. The WSJ had a clear majority that fluctuates between
positive and neutral (55 and 29 respectively), yet there was a clear critical trend (26 total) that
would suggest that the designers of the supplement wished to establish some credibility by
including criticism of certain aspects of Russia’s economy. WP has very few articles about
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economics but they are generally positive or neutral (April only had one economics article and it
was also the WP supplement’s only critical framing during the study).

Other
*NB “Other” includes pieces of data labeled sports, science and technology, education, and an
original other category that featured everything else that didn’t belong to one of the other
categories.

NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Other
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WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in Other
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
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Neutral

Positive

The sample size for these is again fairly small, but each one shows that positive messages are
preferred in RBTH.

Secondary Framing
The data set is considerably smaller for the secondary framing (120) to that of the primary
framing (407). The general makeup of this group is as follows:

Secondary Framing by Categories

Politics

12%
31%

Culture
History

24%

Economics

8%
16%

9%

Ukrainian Crisis/Sanction
Other
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As this chart shows the break up is fairly even among the categories, with politics and Ukraine
ranking the highest. However, the low number of data piece makes it undesirable to expand
and analyze the data in as much detail as before. Instead, I will present a general overview of
the style of the articles in each publication as a whole, instead of in a month by month fashion.

Style for Secondary Framing
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Style for Secondary Framing
Ukraine

Style for Secondary Framing
Other
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As we can see from these graphs, the secondary framing of an article is typically a place to
express criticism. This is indicative of a tactic that I have dubbed “address and redirect.” In this
tactic, the article expresses briefly in its opening lines a variety of issues or criticisms about
something that is only slightly related to the main topic of the article. For example, an article
might begin by stating a few facts about the 2011-12 opposition protests in Russia and their
suppression and dispersion. The article would briefly make mention that this is a troubling
thing for Russia. However, it would then switch topics and state something innocuous or
positive that would then become the main focal point of the rest of the article.
This simple misdirection is one of the primary ways that RBTH attempts to remain
credible with its audience. They understand that most Americans will have heard something
about the problems that face Russia. They also understand a principle of soft power that Nye
explained simply as this, “preaching at foreigners is not the best way to convert them.”171 This
statement is at the heart of RBTH’s strategy. When one reads enough of these articles (as I
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Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 103.
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have) he begins to get the sense that behind the scenes someone is utterly frustrated that the
readers do not understand the situation as they do, and that they would love simply to just
explain it bluntly to them. However, they diligently wait and continue to play a long game by
using strategies such as “address and redirect” and others dicussed below.
The final point that should be made about these charts is that the large number of WSJ
pieces about the Ukrainian Crisis are typically the result of another strategy; the situation in
Ukraine is presented as bad for business. This is the foremost strategy employed in WSJ for
discussions about Ukraine and the sanctions. There will be more about this a little later.

Tertiary Framing
The data set for the tertiary framing (23) is very smaller than for the secondary framing. As a
result, I will only provide a pie chart of the different categories:

Tertiary Framing by Category

Politics

17%
35%

Culture
History
Economics

26%
9%

0%
13%

Ukrainian Crisis/Sanction
Other

Again, the tertiary framing is typically a place that a small topic would be discussed and it would
result in the use of “address and redirect.” Because of the nature and length of a newspaper
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article, these mentions were usually appearing only in the largest of articles and warranted only
a few sentences within them.

Authorship and Geographic Location

The main thing to take into account regarding authors beyond the fact that the vast
majority of pieces are written by staff at RBTH or freelancers working directly for RBTH, is that
with respect to the United States, RBTH is careful with its criticism, which makes perfect sense
since it is trying to communicate to an American audience. When they do criticize the US
directly without any qualifiers (i.e. both the West and Russia are to blame, etc.), the author
tends to be American, or at least an American is central to the criticism. There were only five
articles that were primarily targeted at the United States. Out of those five, American
academics/thinktankers constituted three of the authors. The other two were a scathing
interview with Oliver Stone, where he condemns the US and praises Russia, and an article
written by an RBTH journalist that was critical of the outgoing ambassador to Russia, who he
claims made very few friends during his time in Russia.
On the other side, there are eight articles primarily critical of only Russia, and 20 that
are primarily critical of the Russian economy. However, this is not to say that there is no
criticism of the United States. The difference is that this is contained in a collective criticism.
There are 32 articles that are primarily critical of the United States and others, including Russia.
In this case, there is a rather equal distribution of authors between a journalists from RBTH and
an academic/thinktankers from the US or Russia. In the end, it is smart not to criticize the
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target country unless you have cover by way of an author from that country or that the target
country is merely a part of a larger problem.

3.2 Strategies

As discussed briefly above, RBTH uses a variety of strategies to accomplish its mission of
persuasion. Some are positive and some are negative. I will give a brief description of the main
strategies and their usage. (NB: an article can use more than one strategy and as a result these
categories can share articles. In addition, not all articles were coded with a strategy, for a
variety of reasons such as they were too short, lacked substance, etc.)

“Improving Relations with China”
This strategy involves the basic idea of showing that sanctions and worsening ties will only lead
Russia to grow closer to China, which it is perfectly happy to do. There were 18 total articles
that employed this strategy and 16 of them were in WSJ, 2 in NYT and none in WP. In addition,
this strategy increased over time. (NB: WSJ and NYT did not publish an October edition).

"Improving Relations with China" by Date
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This category includes any discussions about internal Russian politics. Topics include articles
about how the Russian Opposition was disorganized, how the Russian public supports the
Russian government on Ukraine, and other articles about how Russians are united. There were
only seven articles that employed this strategy (3 in WSJ and NYT each and 1 in WP).

“Business not Politics”
This is a straightforward category that simply tries to make the point that business is business
and politics is politics. This strategy was employed 9 times (8 in WSJ and 1 in NYT). This
strategy was also the general focus of the November WSJ supplement which featured 6 uses of
this strategy.

“Promoting cooperation”
This category argues for greater levels of cooperation and includes tactics like “cooperation is
key to success”; “we must end divisions”; “cross-cultural cooperation and education is highly
needed!”; and “war is not the answer” (peace through cooperation). This strategy was
employed 7 times (5 in WP and 2 in NYT). All of these happened in September (1), October (2),
and November (4). This was one of the central themes for the November WP supplement.

“Russia is not so different from the West”
This category attempts to target common ground between Russia and the United States. This
can be focused on pointing to positive similarities in terms of politics, culture, etc. Or it can be
a little more negative in nature, such as “everyone hates terrorists/Islamic extremists so let’s
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fight them together!” This code was used 36 times and the following graph will help to show
how it was used.
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“Americans and Russians are different”
Vexingly this category takes the opposite tactic as the previous one. This category focuses on
things like religious differences, that America and Russia are opposites in terms of culture,
religion, and/or politics; and differences of opinion: "we see things differently from you". This
category seems to be devoted to explaining why we don’t understand each other, while the
previous one could go hand in hand with the strategy of promoting cooperation. This strategy
was used considerably less than the cooperation and similarities strategies discussed above. It
was only used 4 times. Once in the April WP, and then once in the May, October, and
November supplements of NYT.

“Highlighting American and Russian ties/history/comradely/relations”
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This category is one of the central categories for RBTH. It focuses on promoting all of the
successful experiences between Russia and the United States. This includes things like
successful US-Russia Cooperation, explaining how Russians love American things (i.e. culture,
food, etc.), and highlighting Russian culture in America. This strategy was used the most out of
any strategy (91 times).

"Highlighting Russian-American Ties"
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“The Russian government is a force for good in the world and within Russia”
This category is another rather large category and is designed as part of the heart of
selling Russia to America. This category talks about things like the environment being equally
important to Russia; how gender equality and human rights are also important to Russians; how
Russia makes scientific advances; how Russia battles global problems like Ebola. In addition,
the positive nature of internal Russian progress is discussed by arguing that “we are making
great strides in” (for example) Russian Civil Society, which is healthy; coming to terms with the
past; and the tolerance of other cultures. This category was used 24 times primarily in NYT (13)
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and WP (10). This also became a consistent focal point beginning in May and continuing
through to November.

“Russia is Modern/Modernizing/Globalized/Economically Friendly”
This category is also a large part of attracting Americans to Russia, and in particular, businessinclined Americans. This category includes things like: approving of/highlighting clever Russian
business tactics; arguing that independent competitors exist in Russia; Russia is more than just
a producer of energy; Russia is globalized; Russia is making international business easier; Russia
is combating corruption; Russia is an economic force to be reckoned with; Russians have
influence and purchasing power in the US economy; Russia can and does compete with the
West; Russia can take the economic fight to America; human rights progress is good for
business; in Russia renewable energy is also important. Although this was not a focal point in
WP (only 2 uses), NYT featured it 10 times and WSJ featured it 23 times. It was featured
consistently throughout the year.

“Russia is still cooperating with the world despite sanctions/tensions”
In a similar manner to some of the earlier strategies, this strategy attempts to drive home the
point that Russia is still focused on business regardless of the political atmosphere. This
category also argues the point that there's still money to be made despite sanctions and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. This was primarily used by the WSJ (11) times with only 2 uses each for
WP and NYT. It was one of the focal points for the June and September WSJ editions, featuring
4 articles employing this strategy each month.
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“We have a lot to offer”
This category is another central strategy to cultivate favorable opinion toward Russia. This
category includes the various attempts by RBTH to promote Russia’s culture, science,
technology, sports, etc. which RBTH believes will bring Russia into a more positive light. In
addition, this category also includes items that are meant to improve Americans’ knowledge of
Russian culture etc. by teaching the readers about the Russian language and history as well as
providing a children’s section “RBTH for Kids” in NYT which teaches children about the
language, culture, and important people from Russian history. This strategy has been employed
more than all the strategies, on 73 occasions. The NYT supplement employs this strategy as a
focal point for its entire edition with 43 uses of this strategy. WP also employs this strategy
heavily with 25 uses. WSJ only used it 5 times. This makes sense due to the cultural focus of
both the NYT and WP supplements.
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“Historical challenge/explanation”
This category also tends to try to teach the reader more about Russia. However, this strategy
tends to be a bit more pontifical, but is fairly appealing to anyone with a history background as
it attempts and typically succeeds at providing a nuanced view of history from both sides of an
issue. It typically tends to favor the Russian interpretation of history, but this makes sense
because it can be assumed that the reader more than likely already understands the
American/Western version. A main issue in these articles is explaining how the Ukrainian Crisis
was a long time coming. This strategy was used most heavily in the WP with 9 uses, including 3
in April that attempted to explain the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea. The NYT
supplement also used this 4 times, but never as concentrated. Interestingly, but not surprising,
the WSJ supplement of RBTH never used this strategy.

“Ukraine Needs Us”
In this category, the authors attempt to highlight the closeness that they claim exist between
Russia and Ukraine. This category is the main way of justifying the Ukrainian crisis and the
annexation of Crimea, apart from the previous strategy. This category includes the subcategories that can be summed up in the following phrases: “Ukraine wants special treatment
from us still”; “there is a humanitarian crisis Eastern Ukraine”; “Russia wants to work with
Ukraine”; “Russia is able to help in Crimea or other areas that desperately need its help by
providing finances and stability.” Because of the dual political and economic nature of this
category the RBTH supplements in WP and WSJ both employed it 4 times while it was only
employed once in the NYT.
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“Ukraine is Geopolitical”
This strategy argues that the crisis in Ukraine is strictly a geopolitical crisis. Sub-strategies
include: “the US doesn't actually care about Ukraine. It is actually interested in financial gain”
and “America is interested in Ukraine for energy supremacy in Europe.” This strategy was a
relatively late edition with one article in NYT in October, then one article each in WSJ and NYT
in November, and a final article in December in NYT.

“Accusatory/ Negative/Critical towards the West/NATO/EU/America”
This strategy calls out the West’s alleged responsibility for various problems. Sub-strategies
include: “the West does not understand what is going on”; “the West is not so great”; “NATO
started it”; “Edward Snowden”; the US could bully businesses in America”; “the West doesn’t
want to get along with us”; “US overreach”; “the West is escalating tensions”; “the US and EU
are running counter to the market”; “the EU backs out of economic negotiations”; and “Russia
is cracking down on foreign meddling.” Despite the wide range of possible uses of this strategy,
it was only used 16 times (8 in WSJ, 5 in WP, 3 in NYT). Again this is not a terrible surprise, as
criticism of the intended audience is less than productive in this environment.

“Media Criticism”
This strategy is critical of US/Western media bias. In addition, it is critical of black and white
reporting. Despite the aforementioned studies confirming the existence of media bias toward
Russia in the US, this was only pointed out 4 times (3 in WP and 1 in NYT).

“The US and EU aren't playing by the Rules”
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This strategy attempts to claim that Russia is trying to play by the rules established by the US
and EU, but that the US and EU won’t abide by them. This category also claims that the
sanctions against Russia are illegal. This strategy was employed primarily in supplements to
WSJ (9 times) with 3 in the WP and 1 in NYT versions of RBTH.

“Americans don't know much about Russia”
This strategy is primarily focused on combatting stereotypes and other misconceptions that
people in the United States have about Russia. This strategy was used 6 times with 3 in WP, 2
in NYT, and once in WSJ.

“Sanctions could/do have an effect on America/Americans”
This strategy is focused on how the sanctions could be bad for America (or the West). In
addition this category likes to reassert the point that Russia has also imposed sanctions on the
US/EU. Moreover, this category attempts to argue that sanctions hurt cooperation/progress,
including in space. This strategy was primarily employed in the WSJ (10 times) and with
increasing frequency later in the year. The NYT supplement used it 5 times while that for WP
only used it twice.

“Why do you want to keep hurting us?”
This strategy is focused on the deterioration of the Russian economy during the latter part of
2014. A key component of this is the fact that many Russians believe that the sanctions are
meant to hurt Russia(ns). This strategy was only used 3 times and only in the NYT. However, it
was concentrated in November and December, and thus could possibly continue into 2015.
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“Russia can survive sanctions/outlast the West”
This strategy argues that Russia is resilient and essentially that Russians can cope with
hardships, but can the West also cope with hardships? This strategy was used 14 times with
half of the uses being in WSJ. The June supplement of WSJ had this strategy as a focal point.
This strategy was also used in NYT as a focal point for the September edition, which constituted
3 of its 4 uses in that month.

“Ukrainian crisis/sanctions are bad for business”
This strategy is central to RBTH’s response to the sanctions. It highlights a variety of different
ways that Russia and the West could be making money, building relationships, etc. if it wasn’t
for these pesky sanctions. For the WSJ (24), and to a lesser extent NYT (8), this was a focal
point for most of the year. As the chart below shows, both used this as a central focal point for
one or more issues. In the case of WSJ, this strategy was the central focal point in 3 of the last 4
issues of the supplement for 2014. (NB: This strategy was never used in WP which is therefore
omitted from the following graph.
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7. Conclusions
RBTH engages with the American people on a variety of different topics, using a variety
of different tactics and strategies to attempt to “attract” the American people toward having a
more favorable opinion of the government of the Russian Federation, the people of Russia, the
businesses of Russia and the culture of Russia. Through my research, I have found that in
general RBTH uses a systematic approach to the production of its supplements. Each
supplement is structured and designed with the reader in mind, and it consistently provides the
reader with coherent articles on topics of potential interest. RBTH employs a variety of
strategies that aim to provoke and entice the reader into understanding more about the
Russian mindset.
In addition, RBTH is specifically designed to engage with an elite demographic. This
strategy is at the core of the RBTH mission, and its own website even makes mention of it. In
this capacity, RBTH is a rather unique part of the Russian soft power/public diplomacy arsenal.
Many of the other aspects of Russia’s soft power/public diplomacy that are focused on media
are often meant to flood the media with a multitude of stories that attempt to alter public
perception by sheer force of size and abundance (e.g. RT, Rossiya Segodnaya). However, RBTH
provides a very different weapon to Russia’s soft power/public diplomacy arsenal due to its
intended audience and the effectiveness with which its articles are able to mimic the journalist
integrity of the parent newspapers that are connected to its publication. As such, I argue that
continued study of RBTH is vital to understanding this new, more nuanced feature of Russian
soft power/public diplomacy.
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The use of negative strategies runs somewhat counter to prevailing theories of
production of effective soft power/public diplomacy cultivation techniques, but in the case of
RBTH, they appear to be justified for two main reasons. First, the chaotic and volatile nature of
the time when the supplements were published deemed it somewhat necessary to expose
harsh truths and provide frank words on touchy subjects. Second, these negative strategies
add a sense of legitimacy to the supplements for the reader. Quite frankly, anything written
about Russian-US relations in the context of 2014 without at least some degree of
confrontation would have seemed totally out of touch with reality. Tensions were high and
relations were getting worse. To ignore this and pretend that all was well would have been
disingenuous, and it certainly would have cost the supplements a significant amount of their
credibility.
Beyond the negative aspects of part of the strategy, the pointed nature of each edition
of the supplements to its specific audience is shown clearly in the strategies employed. In an
overall sense, each edition tended to have a theme, which it wished to portray. Each theme
would change over time as situations in the real world changed. For example, the early editions
of 2014 (especially for the WSJ) were relatively subdued about the sanctions. They typically
took the attitude that sanctions are an inconvenience, but Russians and Americans will work
around them because, after all, business must go on. However, as the Russian economy began
to seriously struggle in the second half of 2014, RBTH’s attitude toward the sanctions changed
dramatically. By the last quarter of the year, the supplements had taken on almost a pleading
tone. However, at the same time they each remained resiliently optimistic (if not subtly so)
about the future prospects of cooperation despite the sanctions.
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Ultimately, the RBTH supplements are an effective and useful tool in the cultivation and
creation of soft power in the United States. As discussed above, these supplements reach large
numbers of intelligent and influential Americans, with about half of these people reading at
least some of the articles. Those who do engage with RBTH will find a series of thoughtful, wellwritten articles. Although these articles are produced with the expressed intention of
influencing and attracting the reader to something that is probably foreign to them, they do not
reflect any sinister intentions or other ominous dangers on the surface. Instead, these
supplements focus primarily on creating a stronger human bond between the peoples and
businesses of two of the most powerful states on earth, which have been locked in a fiercely
competitive struggle for supremacy against one another for much of the last century.
Regardless of the currently perceived dominance of the United States of America and the
currently perceived isolation and weakness of the Russian Federation, the study of the
machinations of the Russian Federation in terms of gaining larger popular support for its
interests around the world (especially within the United States) is of vital importance. If the
Russian Federation wishes to successfully influence policies of current foreign adversaries, then
the aims and methods of RBTH and similar strategies will be the most important parts of this
success, based largely on the elite demographic that they wish to engage through these efforts.
As a result, further studies of RBTH are needed in order to fully understand what message the
Russian Federation is trying to convey to this audience and whether it is successful in the
delivery of this message.
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Appendix
1. List of RBTH Supplements Analyzed

Publisher
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
Washington Post
New York Times
Washington Post
Wall Street Journal
New York Times
Washington Post
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
New York Times
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
New York Times
Washington Post
New York Times
Wall Street Journal
New York Times

Date
February 1, 2014
February 5, 2014
March 5, 2014
March 28, 2014
April 2, 2014
April 5, 2014
May 21, 2014
June 4, 2014
June 7, 2014
September 3, 2014
September 17, 2014
September 26, 2014
October 1, 2014
October 15, 2014
November 5, 2014
November 19, 2014
November 29, 2014
December 17, 2014

